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Consciousness transiently fades away during deep sleep, more stably under anesthesia, and sometimes 
permanently due to brain injury. The development of an index to quantify the level of consciousness 
across these different states is regarded as a key problem both in basic and clinical neuroscience. We 
argue that this problem is ill-defined since such an index would not exhaust all the relevant information 
about a given state of consciousness. While the level of consciousness can be taken to describe the actual 
brain state, a complete characterization should also include its potential behavior against external 
perturbations. We developed and analyzed whole-brain computational models to show that the stability of 
conscious states provides information complementary to their similarity to conscious wakefulness. Our 
work leads to a novel methodological framework to sort out different brain states by their stability and 
reversibility, and illustrates its usefulness to dissociate between physiological (sleep), pathological (brain-
injured patients), and pharmacologically-induced (anesthesia) loss of consciousness. 
 


































Human consciousness can be understood in terms of its contents, but also as a state extended in time. The 
contents of consciousness are frequently investigated from a functional perspective, combining task-based 
paradigms from cognitive neuroscience with different neuroimaging methods to reveal the brain 
mechanisms associated with explicit or implicit reports of conscious awareness (1). The study of 
temporally extended conscious states is more elusive, with different authors agreeing more often on 
specific examples than on broad and clear definitions (2-5). Some examples include the different stages of 
the human wake-sleep cycle (6), the acute effects of anesthesia (7), and post-comatose disorders of 
consciousness (8). These states cannot be defined by the specific nature of their content; instead, our 
intuition suggests that they involve overall reductions in the intensity or level of consciousness, perhaps 
up to the point of becoming completely void of subjective experiences. A natural question emerges from 
these considerations: how can the level of consciousness be estimated from third-person measurements, 
and what is the validity of this estimation? 
 
Several unidimensional scales have been developed and implemented for the purpose of measuring the 
level of consciousness. Some are based on the observation and quantification of behaviour, such as the 
scales used during surgery to determine the depth of anesthesia, or those employed by neurologists to 
diagnose the severity of disorders of consciousness in brain-injured patients (9). Others are obtained from 
recordings of spontaneous or evoked brain activity, either by following a data-driven approach or by 
computations informed by theoretical developments (10-15). For instance, information integration theory 
(IIT) posits that the level of consciousness corresponds to the amount of integrated information (ɸ) in the 
brain (16), which can be approximated by different metrics of complexity and data compressibility (17). 
These and other examples present the common feature of collapsing whole-brain activity data into a 
single numerical index that is expected to correlate with the outcome of behavioral scales, akin to a 
“thermometer” capable of objectively measuring the level of consciousness taking a state of healthy 
wakefulness as a reference point (18). 
 
Leaving issues of practicality aside, it seems questionable that a single number can adequately describe 
the global state of human consciousness. The brain is a highly complex system composed of 1010 
nonlinear units (neurons) interacting in 1015 sites (synapses) (19). Considering this astonishing level of 
complexity, it is surprising that the brain self-organizes into a discrete and reduced number of 
behaviorally distinct states (20), let alone that these states can be placed along a unidimensional 
continuum parametrized by the level of consciousness (5). In reality, most numerical constructs 
associated with human brain and behaviour present multiple independent factors - consider, for example, 
the leading models of personality, intelligence, and mental disorders, all of which are multidimensional 
(21-23). Analogously, states of consciousness can be described by factors related to content (e.g. the level 
of sensory gating) and function (e.g. the degree of global availability of information for cognitive 
processing), a view that can be extended to states observed during certain psychiatric conditions, or 
arising as a consequence of pharmacological stimulation (24). In turn, each of these dimensions 
implicates specific brain functional systems, as opposed to the global and emergent character of metrics 
related to complexity and information integration. Still, numerical metrics for consciousness could be 





In contrast to this view, we propose that numerical metrics are essentially insufficient - even when 
considered as approximations. A way of framing this insufficiency is noting that consciousness can be 
characterized by descriptive and perturbational dimensions or, equivalently, by the actual and potential 
state of the brain. The first dimension is related to the question “how does this state feel like and what sort 
of behavior does it entail?”, while the second addresses the stability of the state, thus answering the 
question: “how will this state behave if perturbed?”. The perturbational dimension is uncorrelated with 
complexity-based metrics, since both deep sleep and general anesthesia present marked reductions in 
complexity and information integration (15,25), yet the first can spontaneously revert to wakefulness 
upon sensory stimulation, while the second is associated with a more persistent state of unresponsiveness. 
An analogy with the mechanical systems studied in physics can be useful to consolidate the difference 
between both ways of describing a global brain state. Following this analogy, states of consciousness are 
identified with equilibrium points, and the level of consciousness corresponds to the mechanical energy 
associated with those points (26). As in the physical analogy, however, the level of consciousness fails to 
completely characterize present and future behavior. For this purpose, the stability must also be taken into 
account; for instance, by investigating how the system reacts to different external perturbations. 
 
We pursued this line of inquiry by investigating functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data 
corresponding to three different states of reduced consciousness: sleep, propofol anesthesia, and post-
comatose disorders of consciousness in brain injured patients. First, we compared the similarity between 
these states using machine learning classifiers, thus constructing metrics that reflect the level of conscious 
awareness relative to reference states of healthy wakefulness. Next, we assessed whether transitions 
between these states could be induced by external stimulation in whole-brain dynamical system models of 







We explored the similarities and differences between brain states associated with varying levels of 
consciousness, including wakefulness (W), three progressively deeper sleep stages (N1, N2, N3), 
propofol-induced sedation (S) and anesthesia (LoC), and in patients suffering from disorders of 
consciousness (DoC), all diagnosed as unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS) or in the minimally 
conscious state (MCS). These states were compared using four different distance metrics. The 
“classification distance” between two states was obtained by training a random forest classifier to 
distinguish the first state from wakefulness, and assessing its generalization accuracy (i.e. transfer 
learning) when distinguishing the second state from wakefulness,  using whole-brain functional 
connectivity  (FC) between blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signals as input (Pallavicini et al., 
2019). The “connectivity correlation distance” between two states was based on computing the linear 
correlation coefficient between regional FC profiles from both states after subtraction of wakefulness FC 
as a baseline. A high correlation implied that the FC profile of the region changed similarly between both 
states relative to wakefulness. This distance was then defined as the proportion of regions in the whole-




The remaining two definitions were based on the results of a whole-brain computational model of brain 
activity, constructed by coupling regional dynamics with structural connectivity estimated from DTI data 
(Fig. 1) (28). The dynamics of each region were given by the normal mode of a Hopf bifurcation (also 
known as a Stuart-Landau nonlinear oscillator), presenting three qualitatively different regimes depending 
on a single bifurcation parameter: steady dynamics governed by noise (a<0), self-sustained oscillations at 
the fundamental frequency of the regional empirical BOLD time series (a>0), and unstable behavior 
switching back and forth between these two regimes (a≈0) (29). Local bifurcation parameters were 
optimised to reproduce the empirical FC of each state, with the constraint that regions located within 
different resting state networks (RSNs) (30) contributed as independent anatomical priors to parameter 
variation (28). Afterwards, the “model parameter distance” between two states was computed as the 
euclidean distance between the associated set of optimal bifurcation parameters obtained after fitting the 
model to the empirical FC using genetic algorithms (i.e. one local parameter per region in the whole-brain 
parcellation). Finally, the “perturbational distance” was determined from the behavior of the whole-brain 
model against simulated external oscillatory perturbations. This framework consists of fitting the whole-
brain model to the empirical FC of each brain state and then applying an in silico stimulation protocol to 
assess the likelihood of inducing transitions between pairs of states (27,31). The procedure followed to 
construct the model and its sources of empirical information are described in Fig. 1. We then simulated 
external perturbations using an additive periodic forcing term of variable amplitude incorporated to the 
dynamical equations of each pair of homotopic regions, and evaluated whether the perturbation increased 
the similarity between the simulated FC and the empirical FC of another target state (27,28). For example, 
we evaluated whether external stimulation applied to the model fitted to wakefulness FC could displace 
the simulated FC towards that of sleep, anesthesia or brain injured patients, and vice-versa. If affirmative, 
we interpreted that a transition could be induced between both states, leading to a low “perturbational 
distance” value. 
 
The first three metrics are data-driven and can be computed directly from the empirical fMRI data, or 
from the inferred model parameters without addition of external stimulation, hence they can be 
considered descriptive metrics. The fourth metric is perturbational, since it measures whether external 
stimulation can drive simulated whole-brain FC between patterns typical of different states of 
consciousness. 
 
Classification distance between N3, LoC and UWS 
 
We started by studying the similarity between states associated with deepest unconsciousness in our 
dataset: N3 sleep, LoC and the UWS group of patients. As an exploratory first step, we calculated the 
average difference in FC for each state vs. wakefulness. These differences are shown in Fig. 2A, both in 
matrix form and as anatomical renderings of the functional connections associated with the top and 
bottom 5% differences. A similar pattern of FC changes is evident for N3 and LoC (correlation between 
FC difference matrices: R=0.65), consisting of reduced FC in occipital and parietal regions, and increased 
FC in frontal regions. On the other hand, UWS patients did not present such clear patterns, with high 
magnitude FC differences scattered throughout the whole brain (UWS vs. LoC: R=-0.1; UWS vs. N3: R = 
-0.1). This suggests that FC changes relative to conscious wakefulness during N3 sleep and LoC present 




Next, we used individual subject FC data to train and evaluate three random forest classifiers to 
distinguish W from N3, LoC and UWS. After training and testing by cross-validation, each classifier was 
applied to recognize the other two brain states from the corresponding W data (i.e. transfer learning was 
assessed).  Arrows in Fig. 2B indicate significant transfer learning classification accuracy; for example, 
an arrow from LoC to N3 indicates that a random forest classifier trained to distinguish LoC from W 
presented significant accuracy when applied to distinguish N3 from W. The three classifiers presented 
high and significant (p<0.001) performance when distinguishing W from the brain states used for their 
training (indicated as self arrows in Fig. 2B): N3 vs.W, <AUC> = 0.948 ± 0.005; LoC vs. W, <AUC> = 
0.949 ± 0.004; UWS vs. W, <AUC> = 0.973 ± 0.001 (mean ± std). Next, we used the trained classifiers to 
sort datasets different from the ones they were originally trained to distinguish. We found that algorithms 
trained using N3 sleep generalized well to the classification of LoC from W and vice-versa, yielding 
significant transfer learning (p<0.05) for the classifier trained using N3 sleep and evaluated on LoC 
(<AUC> = 0.92 ± 0.02), and for the classifier trained using LoC and evaluated on N3 sleep ( <AUC> = 
0.91 ± 0.01). However, significant transfer learning was not obtained for classifiers trained or evaluated 
using the UWS dataset, thus establishing that the descriptive classifier distance metric dissociated 
physiological and pharmacologically-induced states of unconsciousness from the group of patients with 
most severe disorders of consciousness. This could reflect the different patterns of FC changes that are 
associated with transient (N3 sleep, LoC) and persistent (UWS) states of unconsciousness (Fig. 2A). 
 
 
Regional FC similarity between states of consciousness 
 
Next, we investigated local similarities between states of unconsciousness by means of the connectivity 
correlation distance. Fig. 3 shows anatomical renderings of the regions presenting a significant correlation 
of their profiles of FC changes relative to wakefulness between the states indicated in each inset text. For 
instance, the top left panel highlights the regions whose local FC profile changed similarly during N1 and 
N2 sleep, in both cases relative to wakefulness. We first observe that most regions in the frontal lobe 
changed their FC profile similarly during N1 and N2 sleep and that this also happened for most brain 
regions in the comparison between N2 and N3 sleep, but for fewer regions in the comparison between N1 
and N3 sleep. The changes in FC brought upon by N3 sleep were also very similar to those seen in LoC, 
but their similarity to S was less marked. FC changes during N2 sleep were less similar to LoC than those 
observed during N3 sleep. Finally, regional FC changes during DoC states (MCS and UWS) were not 
significantly correlated with those observed during other states of reduced consciousness, and only 
presented widespread positive correlations between them. Taken together, these results show that states of 
deeper unconsciousness are more similar between them than compared to transitional states for which 
consciousness could be partially preserved, such as N1 sleep and S. An exception was found in the 
comparison between S and LoC, where most brain regions presented similar FC changes, possibly 
stemming from a similar neurochemical mechanism activated by propofol at different doses. Correlations 
were more widespread between the states belonging to each different route towards unconsciousness, i.e. 
between states corresponding to different sleep stages, propofol doses, and DoC severity. As in the results 
obtained using the classification distance (Fig. 2), DoC behaved very differently from the other states: no 




Descriptive distance metrics between states of consciousness 
 
We extended the results shown in Figs. 2 and 3 to include all the possible comparisons between brain 
states, as well as the comparison based on the similarity of the optimal model parameters (“model 
parameter distance”, based on the computational model described in Fig. 1). Fig. 4A presents matrices 
containing z-scores of the aforementioned distance metrics between all pairs of states (note that the 
classification distance was defined as 1-<AUC>). The matrix elements are presented in graph form in 
Fig.4B, with only the top 25% matrix elements being shown. 
 
The first matrix is based on the proportion of significant regions shown in Fig. 3, i.e., the ratio between 
the number of significant regions and the 90 regions in the brain atlas (“connectivity correlation 
distance”). As shown in Fig. 3, contiguous sleep stages presented the lowest distances, while the distance 
between S/LoC and sleep stages gradually increased from N3 to N1 sleep. As also expected from the 
previous figures, MCS and UWS patients were highly similar between them but not when compared to 
the other states. Similar results were obtained for the classification distance (Fig. 4A, second matrix), 
which is already evident by inspection of the matrix and its associated graph. The results obtained 
comparing the optimal model parameters (Fig. 4A, third matrix) appear slightly different, but still 
preserve the three main findings observed for the other metrics: sleep stages of similar depth tended to 
present the highest similarities, S and LoC were more similar between them than to sleep stages, and DoC 
patients presented idiosyncratic changes that set them apart from the other states of consciousness. 
 
Fig. 4C shows a quantitative evaluation of the similarity between the three matrices, establishing that each 
descriptive distance metric can be used to predict all others. In these figures, each point corresponds to a 
pair of brain states, with X and Y coordinates based on the different combinations of distance metrics. As 
shown in the last panel, for example, pairs of brain states presenting high machine learning transfer 
learning accuracy also yielded similar model parameters, and vice-versa. In particular, all three metrics 
converge in the dissociation between sleep and propofol-induced unconsciousness from DoC patients.  
 
Perturbational distance between states of consciousness 
 
After optimizing the computational model to reproduce the empirical FC of initial and target states, we 
systematically simulated the effects of an external periodic perturbation introduced at all pairs of 
homotopic regions. The perturbation was applied in the model optimized to reproduce the FC of the initial 
state, and we evaluated how increasing perturbation amplitudes impacted on the model goodness of fit 
computed relative to the target state. The perturbational distance was computed as the best goodness of fit 
relative to the target state across amplitudes. According to this definition, a low distance indicates that a 
suitable combination of perturbation amplitude and stimulation site is capable of displacing the initial FC 
towards that of the target state, i.e. a transition between initial and target state can be induced by external 
stimulation in the model.  
 
The perturbational distances between all pairs of physiological, pharmacologically-induced and 
pathological states of consciousness are summarized in matrix representation in Fig. 5A. A directed graph 
constructed from these matrix elements is presented in Fig. 5B, where each arrow indicates that certain 
stimulation parameters induce a transition from the initial to the target state with 𝛥𝐺𝑜𝐹 ≤0.3. We observe 
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that certain states receive several directed connections (e.g. W) while others present the opposite 
behaviour (e.g. N1 sleep). States receiving several connections can be considered stable, since external 
stimulation easily transitions other states of consciousness towards them, but they generally remain the 
same when stimulated; conversely, states sending out several connections easily transition into other 
states when stimulated, and hence can be considered unstable. 
 
In Fig. 5C we place all states of consciousness into a bi-dimensional diagram according to their similarity 
to wakefulness (“level of consciousness”, Y-axis) and their instability, defined as the number of outbound 
connections in Fig. 5B (“instability against perturbations”, X-axis). In this diagram, DoC and LoC appear 
as stable states of reduced consciousness, while W is both conscious and stable. All sleep stages are 
comparatively less stable, with N1 sleep being the most fragile against perturbations, consistent with its 
role as a transitional stage between early and deep sleep. Finally, propofol sedation (S) was intermediate 
both in conscious level and stability. 
 
We classified transitions in two groups, depending on the initial and target state. One group corresponded 
to perturbations that increased the level of consciousness (i.e. all states to W, N2/N3 to N1, N3 to N2, 
LoC to S, MCS to UWS), and another corresponded to perturbations that decreased the level of 
consciousness (i.e. all reverse transitions). For each pair of states we ranked homotopic regions in terms 
of their associated optimal ∆𝐺𝑜𝐹, and computed the average regional ranking separately across all 
transitions in the “increase level” and “decrease level” groups. Thus, a high value for a region in the 
“increase level” group indicates that perturbations applied to that region consistently tended to increase 
the level of consciousness, and vice-versa for the “decrease level” group. Fig. 5D presents a rendering of 
the top 50% homotopic regions in each group. Simulated perturbations applied at the bilateral 
hippocampus, inferior frontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex and primary visual cortex (calcarine sulcus) 
systematically resulted in the best ∆𝐺𝑜𝐹 changes towards states of reduced consciousness. Conversely, 
perturbations applied at the temporo-parietal junction (bilateral angular gyrus), precuneus, precentral 
gyrus and middle frontal cortex resulted in the best ∆𝐺𝑜𝐹 changes towards states of increased 
consciousness. 
 
In contrast to the results shown in Fig. 4C, the perturbational distance metric provided information 
complementary to that obtained from the descriptive distance metrics. Fig. 5E shows that the descriptive 
metrics were not significantly correlated with the perturbational metric; in other words, even though some 
pairs of states presented similar patterns of FC changes relative to wakefulness, externally-induced 















There are two different but related problems in the study of states of reduced consciousness. The first 
concerns the identification of such states from a limited amount of behavioral information and non-
invasive brain activity recordings. This is the challenge faced by clinicians in the identification of DoC, a 
difficult task with up to 40% consensus-based misdiagnosis rate (32), as well as by anesthesiologists in 
the detection and prevention of intraoperative awareness (33). The second problem concerns the 
manipulation of conscious states by means of externally induced perturbations, either to induce 
unconsciousness (i.e. anesthesia) or to restore conscious wakefulness in patients (34-3) These two 
problems map onto the dimensions we explored in the present work and are summarized in Fig. 5C. 
Previous data-driven and theoretical developments for the detection of consciousness from neuroimaging 
data (10-13,15) represent partial solutions: what is also needed is an exhaustive and systematic method to 
investigate the potential behaviour of global brain states under external stimulations. We pursued this 
approach by combining different sources of empirical information with simple but conceptually rich 
models of whole-brain activity, which allowed us to explore the stability of different states of 
consciousness from passive recordings of fMRI data. Importantly, we showed that the perturbational 
analysis provided information complementary to the results of statistical and machine learning techniques 
applied directly to the data.  
 
The representation of whole-brain activity by coupled dynamical systems was a crucial step in our 
analysis. While previous experimental studies investigated the effects of localized external perturbations 
during states of reduced awareness in humans (34-36,39,40), the systematic exploration of targeted 
stimulation is possible by the freedom granted by computational models. We opted to allow regional 
variability in the bifurcation parameters of the model, since different brain regions could be more or less 
relevant to induce transitions between certain states of consciousness, and this variability could depend 
upon the proximity of regional dynamics to the bifurcation point (28,29). The use of RSNs to constrain 
this regional variability, combined with other sources of empirical data, increased the conceptual 
interpretability of our computational model. Due to the semi-empirical nature of the model, we were able 
to show that the inferred parameters reflected the similarities between states of consciousness observed in 
FC patterns; for instance, the distance metric based on random forest transfer learning accuracy was 
significantly correlated with the metric obtained from the comparison of the optimal model parameters 
(Fig. 4C). However, the addition of external stimulation to the model resulted in a distance metric that 
was independent from those obtained without perturbational analysis (Fig. 5E). In particular, this distance 
metric could not be predicted by the similarity of the underlying model parameters, suggesting that 
perturbations are amplified by the system nonlinearities, a behaviour characteristic of systems posed at or 
near a dynamical instability (26,29,41). 
 
States of consciousness can be analyzed in functional terms (i.e. behavior and cognition) as well as by 
quantitative metrics derived from brain activity measurements. It is becoming increasingly clear that 
functional analysis framed in terms of unidimensional “levels of consciousness” could be insufficient to 
capture the richness and heterogeneity of conscious states (5). A conceptually similar unidimensional 
characterization is also pursued by different quantitative indices computed from neural activity 
recordings, such as information integration (42), compressibility (15,25), causal density (18), the 
perturbational complexity index (PCI) (12), and other data-driven metrics. Some of the most 
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commercially successful markers of conscious awareness, such as the bispectral index for anesthesia 
monitoring (10), are based on this approach. Our work questions whether markers of this kind can be 
sufficient, since they do not address the potential behavior of the system against perturbations. Here, it is 
important to draw a distinction between the stability of ongoing neural dynamics and the stability of 
global brain states. PCI (12) and other related data-driven techniques (43) estimate the response of within-
state activity to perturbations, but it is assumed that the applied perturbation does not result in a transition 
between brain states. In contrast, our interest lies precisely in determining the likelihood of observing 
such a transition upon external stimulation. Clearly, these different approaches can yield independent and 
complementary information, since our perturbational distance metric showed a dissociation between 
general anesthesia and deep sleep, while both states present comparable PCI values (12). Finally,  the 
results  obtained from our perturbational analysis are fully consistent with well-understood differences in 
responsiveness between sleep and propofol-induced anesthesia; for example, with the observation that 
arousals are more easily elicited during sleep than under the effects of anesthesia (equivalently, surgeons 
cannot wait for the onset of sleep to start operating). While responsiveness can be probed by direct 
sensory stimulation, our model was capable of reproducing the same result through the exhaustive 
exploration of all pairs of homotopic regions, i.e. not restricted to sensory regions. 
 
Deep sleep and propofol-induced anesthesia present similarities in terms of brain activity and their 
associated neurochemical pathways. Both states are associated with slow (44) and regular activity of 
cortical origin (15,25), breakdown of large-scale FC (45,46), and increased inhibitory neurotransmission 
(47); furthermore, propofol anesthesia may result in sleep-like homeostatic regulation (48). The results we 
presented in Fig. 2 are in line with these observations and also point towards marked differences between 
these states and the conditions of MCS and UWS patients, which have been previously shown to present 
distinct changes in EEG dynamics (49). A recent article demonstrated significant transfer learning 
between datasets comprising propofol anesthesia and DoC patients, which is at odds with the results of 
our analysis (50). We believe this contradiction could arise due to the large variability that exists between 
cohorts of brain-injured patients (51). Future studies should attempt to settle this issue by investigating 
larger and more homogenous patient populations. 
 
Within the different stages of human sleep, we showed that N1 sleep (a transitional stage between 
wakefulness and deep sleep) presented the highest instability against perturbations. N1 sleep is 
characterized by diminished thalamo-cortical coupling with preserved cortical activation, a condition 
compatible with conscious mentation and imagery during the onset of sleep (52). From an evolutionary 
perspective, it is reasonable that N1 sleep is susceptible to transitioning towards wakefulness upon 
external stimulation, since during this stage the individual is vulnerable to environmental threats, while 
offline information processing associated with learning and memory consolidation is not yet taking place 
(53). On the other hand, propofol-induced unconsciousness and DoC are either artificially induced or 
arise as a consequence of brain injury, and thus do not reflect the adaptive pressures that constrain the 
stability of human sleep. These constraints are also reflected in the sequence of states that comprise 
human sleep: the orderly progression from wakefulness to N3 sleep (54) is disrupted when sudden 
awakenings occur. The output of our model was consistent with these dynamics, since external 
perturbation could only induce transitions from N3 sleep to wakefulness, but failed to elicit similar 




The non-reversible nature of severe DoC could be linked to alterations in the underlying structural 
connectivity of the brain,      as a consequence of injury (55,56). While whole-brain functional 
connectivity is known to be preserved even during states of deep unconsciousness (57,58), it tends to 
reduce towards the structural connectivity backbone (20,59,60), suggesting that this backbone imposes a 
limit to the functional disintegration that is possible in healthy brains. However, the analysis of the 
changes reported in Fig. 2 reveals that patients present a substantially different functional architecture 
compared to that seen during sleep and propofol-induced loss of consciousness, which could stem from a 
fundamentally different (and more variable) organization of anatomical connections. We note that our 
analysis does not preclude the possibility of inducing transitions towards conscious wakefulness in 
patients, but individually chosen targets might be necessary due to the aforementioned variability.  Also, 
it could be possible that the recovery of consciousness can be accelerated by neurochemical and 
pharmacological means (61), which cannot be easily accommodated within the proposed modeling 
framework. 
 
The choice of periodic stimulation was determined mainly by the local dynamics, which consisted of 
nonlinear oscillators with a single natural frequency. However, future modeling efforts incorporating 
more complex dynamics could allow in silico rehearsal of interventions with ampler neurobiological 
interpretation; for instance, a dynamic mean-field model informed by empirical receptor density maps 
could be used to explore the result of activating specific neurotransmitter systems (e.g. serotonin, 
dopamine) (62,63).This flexibility could be used to extend our analysis to other conscious states, such as 
those seen in certain psychiatric patients. That different psychiatric conditions can present distinct levels 
of stability is known to clinical practitioners who have encountered patients suffering from bipolar 
disorder on one extreme, and catatonic patients on the other. Also, the application of machine learning 
classifiers combined with computational models could inform the hypothesis that certain pharmacological 
interventions mimic the symptomatology of certain psychiatric syndromes, such as in the 
psychotomimetic hypothesis of serotonin 2A receptor agonists (also known as “psychedelics”) (64). 
 
Our results should not only be discussed in terms of the allowed transitions between states, but also in 
terms of which regions are associated with those transitions, and how those transitions depend on the 
external forcing amplitude. In  Fig. 5D we showed that transitions towards states of heightened 
consciousness were systematically linked to perturbations located in the precuneus, temporo-parietal 
junction and the middle frontal cortex, regions presenting a significant overlap with the default mode 
network (65) and in line with electrical stimulation targets shown to improve behavioural signatures of 
consciousness in DoC patients (38). These regions have also been shown to robustly reflect the level of 
consciousness (46,55,66,67) and conscious information access in cognitive neuroscience paradigms (1). 
Consistently with previous work (28), the effect of perturbing these regions also depended on the 
amplitude of the periodic forcing term; for instance, perturbations applied to the temporo-parietal junction 
asymptotically increased the similarity to wakefulness, while a small perturbation located at the prefrontal 
cortex sufficed to reproduce an arousal. The qualitatively different behavior upon simulated perturbations 
represents a set of rich predictions to be addressed by future experiments. 
 
While each independent source of empirical information incorporated into our model increased its 
interpretability, it also imposed specific limitations to our analysis. For instance, functional connectivity 
was estimated from recordings acquired in different centers, which could represent a potential source of 
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confounds. However, since our approach focused on transfer learning accuracy and each machine 
learning classifier was trained using a control group acquired using a matched scanner and data 
acquisition protocol, we believe it was less vulnerable to classification biases related to different 
experimental conditions. Also, the use of anatomical connectivity estimated in a group of healthy 
participants could represent a limitation for the modeling of patient data. Nevertheless, since brain-injured 
patients may present heterogeneous lesion locations (51) it could be that the average healthy connectivity 
constitutes a reasonable first estimate. Also, since the perturbations failed to induce widespread 
transitions between LoC/sleep and DoC (even when considering the same anatomical connectivity) we 
can expect that this result will be furthered when incorporating more accurate group-specific connectivity. 
 
In conclusion, the investigation of dynamical stability can be informative for the characterization of 
different brain states, allowing the dissociation between reversible vs. non-reversible and pharmacological 
vs. physiological states, with potential applications to neurologic and psychiatric conditions associated 
with persistent states of abnormal consciousness and cognition. We expect that future metrics to monitor 
levels of sleep, anesthesia and residual consciousness in brain injured patients are expanded to represent 
this additional dimension, with positive consequences in clinical practice and in the neuroscientific 
investigation of human consciousness and its disorders.  
 
Materials and Methods 
Experimental data 
We analyzed fMRI recordings from 81 participants scanned at two independent research sites: Frankfurt: 
15 subjects during wakefulness and sleep; Liège: 14 healthy subjects during wakefulness and under 
propofol sedation and anesthesia; 16 patients diagnosed as MCS, 15 patients diagnosed as UWS, and 21 
healthy and awake controls. 
Sleep dataset. Simultaneous fMRI and EEG  was measured for a total of 73 subjects (written informed 
consent, approval by the local ethics committee) in Frankfurt (Germany). EEG via a cap (modified 
BrainCapMR, Easycap, Herrsching, Germany) was recorded continuously during fMRI acquisition (1505 
volumes of T2*-weighted echo planar images, TR/TE = 2080 ms/30 ms, matrix 64 × 64, voxel size 
3 × 3 × 2 mm3, distance factor 50%; FOV 192 mm2) with a 3 T Siemens Trio (Erlangen, Germany). An 
optimized polysomnographic setting was employed (chin and tibial EMG, ECG, EOG recorded bipolarly 
[sampling rate 5 kHz, low pass filter 1 kHz] with 30 EEG channels recorded with FCz as the reference 
[sampling rate 5 kHz, low pass filter 250 Hz].  Scalp potentials measured with EEG allow the classification 
of sleep into 4 stages (wakefulness, N1, N2 and N3 sleep) according to the American Academy of Sleep 
Medicine (AASM) rules (54). Pulse oximetry and respiration were recorded via sensors from the Trio 
[sampling rate 50 Hz]) and MR scanner compatible devices (BrainAmp MR+, BrainAmpExG; Brain 
Products, Gilching, Germany), facilitating sleep scoring during fMRI acquisition. We selected 15 subjects 
who reached stage N3 sleep (deep sleep) and contiguous time series of least 200 volumes for all sleep 
stages. Previous publications based on this dataset can be consulted for further details (see,e.g., ref. 68). 
Propofol sedation and anesthesia.  Resting-state fMRI volumes from 18 healthy subjects were acquired 
in four different states following propofol injection: wakefulness, sedation, unconsciousness, and recovery. 
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Data acquisition was performed in Liège (Belgium) (written informed consent, approval by the Ethics 
Committee of the Medical School of the University of Liège). Subjects fasted for at least 6 h from solids 
and 2 h from liquids before sedation. During the study and the recovery period, electrocardiogram, blood 
pressure, pulse oximetry (SpO2), and breathing frequency were continuously monitored (Magnitude 
3150M; Invivo Research, Inc., Orlando,FL). Propofol was infused through an intravenous catheter placed 
into a vein of the right hand or forearm. An arterial catheter was placed into the left radial artery. Throughout 
the study, the subjects breathed spontaneously, and additional oxygen (5 l/min) was given through a loosely 
fitting plastic facemask. The level of consciousness was evaluated clinically throughout the study with the 
scale used in ref. 69. The subject was asked to strongly squeeze the hand of the investigator. She/he was 
considered fully awake or to have recovered consciousness if the response to verbal command (“squeeze 
my hand”) was clear and strong (Ramsay 2), as sedated if the response to verbal command was clear but 
slow (Ramsay 3), and as unconscious, if there was no response to verbal command (Ramsay 5–6). Ramsay 
scale verbal commands were repeated twice for each consciousness level assessment.  Functional MRI 
acquisition consisted of resting-state functional MRI volumes repeated in the four states: normal 
wakefulness (Ramsay 2), sedation (Ramsay 3), unconsciousness (Ramsay 5), and recovery of consciousness 
(Ramsay 2). The typical scan duration was half an hour for each condition, and the number of scans per 
session (200 functional volumes) was matched across subjects to obtain a similar number of scans in all 
states. Functional images were acquired on a 3 Tesla Siemens Allegra scanner (Siemens AG, Munich, 
Germany; Echo Planar Imaging sequence using 32 slices; repetition time = 2460 ms, echo time = 40 ms, field 
of view = 220 mm, voxel size = 3.45×3.45×3 mm3, and matrix size = 64×64×32). Previous publications based 
on this dataset can be consulted for further details (see, e.g., ref. 46). 
Disorders of consciousness. The dataset comprised resting-state fMRI volumes on healthy controls (>18 
years old and free of psychiatric and neurological history) and unsedated patients presenting disorders of 
consciousness (Department of Radiology, Centre Hospitalier Universitaire (CHU), Liège) (written 
informed consent to participate in the study was obtained directly from healthy control participants and the 
legal surrogates of the patients, approval by the Ethics Committee of the Medical School of the University 
of Liège).  The cohort included 21 healthy controls (8 females; mean age, 45 ± 17 years), 43 patients (25 in 
MCS, 18 in UWS, 12 females; mean age, 47 ± 18 years. See Supplementary Information with single subject 
demographic information). UWS patients show signs of preserved vigilance, but do not exhibit non-reflex 
voluntary movements, and are incapable of establishing functional communication (70). Patients in MCS 
show more complex behavior indicative of awareness, such as visual pursuit, orientation response to pain, 
and nonsystematic command following; nevertheless, these signs are consistent but may be manifested 
sporadically (71). The inclusion criteria for patients were brain damage at least 7 days after the acute brain 
insult and behavioral diagnosis of MCS or UWS performed with the Coma Recovery Scale–Revised (CRS-
R) (9). The CRS-R is currently the most sensitive scale to characterize disorders of consciousness and 
evaluates and includes 23 arranged items organized on subscales for auditory, visual, motor, oromotor, 
communication, and arousal function. Each item assesses the presence or absence of specific physical signs, 
which represent the integrity of brain function as presence or absence of cognitively mediated 
responsiveness.  
Data were acquired on a 3T Siemens TIM Trio MRI scanner (Siemens Medical Solutions, Erlangen, 
Germany): 300 T2*-weighted images were acquired with a gradient-echo echo-planar imaging (EPI) 
sequence using axial slice orientation and covering the whole brain (32 slices; slice thickness, 3 mm; 
repetition time, 2000 ms; echo time, 30 ms; voxel size, 3 × 3 × 3 mm; flip angle, 78°; field of view, 192 
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mm by 192 mm). A structural T1 magnetization-prepared rapid gradient echo (MPRAGE) sequence (120 
slices; repetition time, 2300 ms; echo time, 2.47 ms; voxel size, 1.0 × 1.0 × 1.2 mm; flip angle, 9°)      
(Demertzi et al., 2019) 
fMRI preprocessing. For each participant and for each brain state, we used FSL tools to extract and 
average the BOLD signals from all voxels. The FSL preprocessing included a 5mm spatial smoothing 
(FWHM), bandpass filtering between 0.01-0.1 Hz, and brain extraction (BET), followed by a 
transformation to a standard space (2mm MNI brain) and down sampling for a final representation in a 
45x54x45, 2mm voxel space.  
The following preprocessing steps were performed using specially developed Matlab scripts. First, we 
correct the data by performing regressions between the displacement parameters and the average signal and 
its first derivative, and eliminate these correlations, since they mainly inform movement. Continuing, we 
perform a scrubbing process by which we eliminate subjects that present significant movements in more 
than 20% of the temporal frames recorded, with a criterion for movement significance set as an absolute 
displacement between consecutive frames larger than 0.5 mm. For the remaining subjects, we removed the 
first 3 frames and those which exceed the aforementioned threshold. Finally, we averaged all voxels within 
each ROI defined in the automated anatomical labeling (AAL) atlas, considering only the 90 cortical and 
subcortical non-cerebellar brain regions (72) to obtain one BOLD signal per ROIs. 
This way, we obtain datasets with comparable smoothness and stability that can be compared across 
conditions. 
During preprocessing, 4 subjects were removed from the anesthesia data set, as well as 9 MCS patients and 
3 UWS patients. (See Supplementary Information) 
Structural Connectivity: The structural connectome was obtained applying diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) 
to diffusion weighted imaging (DWI) recordings from 16 healthy right-handed participants (11 men and 5 
women, mean age: 24.75 ± 2.54 years) recruited online at Aarhus University, Denmark. For each participant 
a 90x90 SC matrix was obtained that represents the connectivity between ROIs. Data preprocessing was 
performed using FSL diffusion toolbox (Fdt) with default parameters. The probtrackx tool in Fdt was used 
to provide automatic estimation of crossing fibers within each voxel, which has been shown to significantly 
improve the tracking sensitivity of non-dominant fiber populations in the human brain. The connectivity 
probability from a seed voxel i to another voxel j was defined as the proportion of fibers passing through 
voxel i that reached voxel j (sampling of 5000 streamlines per voxel [73]). All the voxels in each AAL 
parcel were seeded (i.e. grey and white matter voxels were considered). The connectivity probability 𝑃𝑖𝑗 
from region i to region j was calculated as the number of sampled fibers in region i that connected the two 
regions, divided by 5000 × n, where n represents the number of voxels in region i. The resulting SC matrices 
were computed as the average across voxels within each ROI in the AAL thresholded at 0.1% (i.e. a 
minimum of five streamlines) and normalized by the number of voxels in each ROI. Finally, the data were 





Multivariate machine learning classifiers 
We trained random forest classifiers (74) to distinguish reduced states of consciousness from wakefulness 
based on empirical individual FC matrices (fully connected weighted matrices computed using Pearson’s 
linear correlation coefficient between BOLD time series from each subject), using a five-fold cross-
validation procedure to estimate classifier accuracy. Classifiers were first trained to distinguish between 
wakefulness and a state of reduced consciousness, and their accuracy was then tested in the classification 
between wakefulness and all other states of consciousness (i.e. transfer learning accuracy was assessed). 
Random forest classifiers were trained using scikit-learn (https://scikit-learn.org/) (75). We trained random 
forest classifiers with 1000 decision trees and a random subset of features of size equal to the (rounded) 
square root of the total number of features. The quality of each split in the decision trees was measured 
using Gini impurity, and the individual trees were expanded until all leaves were pure (i.e. no maximum 
depth was introduced). No minimum impurity decrease was enforced at each split, and no minimum number 
of samples was required at the leaf nodes of the decision trees (the classifier hyperparameters can be found 
in https://scikit-learn.org/).  
To assess the statistical significance of the classifier accuracy values, we trained and evaluated a total of 
1000 random forest classifiers using the same features (i.e. FC matrices) as inputs, but scrambling the class 
labels. We then constructed an empirical p-value by counting how many times the accuracy of the classifier 
with scrambled class labels was greater than that of the original classifier All accuracies were computed as 
the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC) and considered significant at p<0.05. 
Subsequently, the generalizability of the classifiers to distinguish other sleep states from wakefulness was 
evaluated by applying both the original and scrambled classifiers, and constructing p-values analogously. 
 
Regional FC similarity 
For all states of consciousness, we computed the average functional connectivity (FC) of each AAL region 
and subtracted the average FC computed from the wakefulness data, thus yielding a regional profile of FC 
changes for each state. We then computed the connectivity correlation distance between pairs of states S1, 
S2 with FC matrices C1, C2 as follows, 
 
𝑑(𝑆1, 𝑆2) = 1 −
1
90
∑ 𝐼(𝑗)90𝑗  (1) 
Where I(j) is defined as, 
𝐼(𝑗) = 1, 𝑖𝑓 |𝑅(𝐶1(𝑖, 𝑗), 𝐶2(𝑖, 𝑗))| > 0.5, 𝑖 = 1 𝑡𝑜 90;  𝑖 ≠ 𝑗   
𝐼(𝑗) = 0, 𝑖𝑓 |𝑅(𝐶1(𝑖, 𝑗), 𝐶2(𝑖, 𝑗))| < 0.5, 𝑖 = 1 𝑡𝑜 90;  𝑖 ≠ 𝑗   
Here, the FC of state 1 is obtained as the average across subjects with wakefulness subtracted, and 





We implemented a whole-brain model consisting of a network of nonlinear oscillators coupled by the 
structural connectome (SC). Each oscillator was modeled by a normal form of a Hopf bifurcation and 
represented the dynamics of one of the 90 brain regions in the AAL template. The key neurobiological 
assumption is that dynamics of macroscopic neural masses can range from fully synchronous (i.e. activated 
state with self-sustained oscillations) to a stable asynchronous state governed by random fluctuations, with 
an intermediate state presenting complex temporal features linked to noise-induced transitions through the 
bifurcation point (28,29). A secondary assumption is that fMRI can capture the dynamics from both regimes 
with sufficient fidelity to be modeled by the equations.  
Without coupling, the local dynamics of brain region j are modeled by the complex-valued equation, 
  𝑑𝑧𝑗 /𝑑𝑡 = (𝑎 + 𝑖𝜔𝑗 )𝑧𝑗 − 𝑧𝑗 |𝑧𝑗|
2 (2) 
In this equation 𝑧𝑗is a complex-valued variable (𝑧𝑗 = 𝑥𝑗 + 𝑖𝑦𝑗 ), and 𝜔𝑗is the intrinsic oscillation 
frequency of node j. The intrinsic frequencies ranged from 0.04-0.07 Hz and were determined by the 
averaged peak frequency of the bandpass-filtered fMRI signals of each individual brain region. The 
parameter a is known as the bifurcation parameter and controls the dynamical behavior of the system. For 
a<0 the phase space presents a unique stable fixed point at 𝑧𝑗 = 0, thus the system asymptotically decays 
towards this point. For a>0 the stable fixed point changes its stability, giving rise to a limit cycle and to 
self-sustained oscillations with frequency 𝑓𝑗 = 𝜔𝑗 /2𝜋 and amplitude proportional to the square root of a 
(see Fig. 1).  
The coordinated dynamics of the resting state activity are modeled by introducing coupling determined by 
the SC. Nodes i and j are coupled by 𝐶𝑖𝑗 (the i,j entry of the SC matrix). To ensure oscillatory dynamics for 
a>0, the SC matrix was scaled to a maximum of 0.2 (weak coupling condition) (29). In full form, the 




= (𝑎 − 𝑥2𝑗 − 𝑦𝑗
2)𝑥𝑗 − 𝜔𝑗 𝑦𝑗 + 𝐺𝛴𝑖 𝐶𝑖𝑗(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗 ) + 𝛽𝜂𝑗 (𝑡) (3)




= (𝑎 − 𝑥2𝑗 − 𝑦𝑗
2)𝑦𝑗 + 𝜔𝑗 𝑥𝑗 + 𝐺𝛴𝑖 𝐶𝑖𝑗(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑗 ) + 𝛽𝜂𝑗(𝑡)
       (4) 
The parameter G represents a global coupling factor that scales SC equally for all the nodes. These equations 
were integrated to simulate empirical fMRI signals using the Euler-Maruyama algorithm with a time step 
of 0.1 seconds. 𝜂j  represents additive Gaussian noise in each node and scaled by  factor β  fixed at 0.04. 
When a is close to the bifurcation (a~0) the additive Gaussian noise gives rise to complex dynamics as the 






Fitting to empirical data 
We selected the group-averaged static functional connectivity of each state of consciousness as the 
empirical observable to be fitted by the model. The BOLD signals corresponding to each ROI in the AAL 
template were filtered in the frequency range of 0.04–0.07 Hz , since this frequency band has been shown 
to contain more reliable and functionally relevant information compared to other frequency bands, and also 
to be less affected by noise (76-79). Subsequently, the filtered time series were transformed into z-scores. 
For each state of consciousness, the amount of participants was selected based on the presence of 
uninterrupted epochs of that state lasting more than 194 samples (Wsleep= 15; N1=15; N2=15; N3=15; 
Wprop=14; S=14; LoC=14;Wcon=21; MCS:16; UWS:15). Afterwards, the FC matrix was computed as the 
matrix of Pearson’s correlation coefficients between the BOLD signals of all pairs of regions of interest 
(ROIs) in the AAL template. Fixed-effect analysis was used to obtain group-level FC matrices, meaning 
that Fisher’s R-to-z transform z=atanh(R) was applied to the correlation values before averaging over 
participants within each state of consciousness. 
We applied the model described by Eqs. 3 and 4 to simulate BOLD signals for each ROI. We used an 
anatomical prior based on six RSNs to constrain how different groups of nodes could contribute 
independently to the final bifurcation parameters. Each local bifurcation parameter was obtained as the 
linear combination of the contribution of the RSNs spanning that ROI. In this way, we embedded the 
parameters governing the dynamics of the 90 ROIs into a six-dimensional parameter space defined by the 
independent contributions of the RSNs (28). We simulated the same number of samples for each subject 
and the same number of subjects per state, and then we followed a procedure to compute the simulated FC 
identical to the one used for the empirical data. We used the structure similarity index (SSIM) (Wang et al., 
2004) as a metric to compare the simulated and empirical FC, thus defining the goodness of fit (GoF) for 
parameter optimization (the target fitting function was defined as 1-GoF). We implemented a genetic 
algorithm to optimize the six parameters and maximize the GoF of the model. For each state of 
consciousness, we simulated an initial population of 10 elements, 200 generations of offspring and then we 
performed 100 independent runs of the genetic algorithm. Previous work implementing the same 
optimization procedure can be consulted for further details (28). Finally, we selected the combination of 
parameters yielding the simulated FC with the lowest GoF among the 100 runs of the algorithm. 
 
Perturbational distance 
The external perturbation was represented as an additive periodic forcing term incorporated to the equation 
of each node, given by 𝐹𝑗 = 𝐹0𝑗𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝜔𝑗𝑡), where 𝐹0𝑗 is the perturbation amplitude and 𝜔𝑗 is the natural 
frequency of node j, computed directly from the BOLD time series. The effects of the perturbation were 
investigated systematically for all 45 pairs of homotopic regions in the AAL atlas, with the purpose of 
providing a conceptual model of the effects of transcranial alternating current stimulation (tACS). This 
perturbation was initially applied in the model with parameters chosen to reproduce an initial state, and the 
amplitude ( 𝐹0𝑗) of node j and its homotopic pair was parametrically increased from 0 to 2 in steps of 0.1 
(averaging 100 independent simulations for each node pair and 𝐹0𝑗value). For each value of  𝐹0𝑗 the 





𝐺𝑜𝐹 (𝐹𝐶𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ,𝐹𝐶𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 )−𝐺𝑜𝐹(𝐹𝐶𝑠𝑖𝑚𝐹 ,𝐹𝐶𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 )
𝐺𝑜𝐹(𝐹𝐶𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ,𝐹𝐶𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 )−𝐺𝑜𝐹(𝐹𝐶𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 ,𝐹𝐶𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 )
  (5) 
 
In this equation, 𝐹𝐶𝑠𝑖𝑚𝐹  is the FC matrix obtained with the perturbation, 𝐹𝐶𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡  represents the 
empirical FC matrix of the target state, 𝐹𝐶𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 is the simulated FC matrix of the target state, and 
𝐹𝐶𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙is the simulated matrix of the initial state. According to this normalization, as ∆𝐺𝑜𝐹approaches 
0 the simulation with optimal bifurcation parameters for the initial state plus the perturbation approaches 
the best empirical fit of the model to the target FC. Conversely, as ∆𝐺𝑜𝐹 increases the perturbation fails to 
change the FC in the direction of the optimal FC of the target state (28). 
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Figure 1. Procedure followed to construct the whole-brain computational model. The dynamics of each 
node in the structural connectivity matrix are represented by a Hopf bifurcation with three possible 
dynamical regimes depending on the value of the bifurcation parameter: stable fixed-point (a<0), stable 
limit cycle (a>0) and a bifurcation between both regimes (a≈0). The local bifurcation parameters are 
optimized to reproduce the empirical FC matrix computed from fMRI data acquired during different 
states of consciousness, and constrained in their variation by the six RSNs (anatomical priors) reported in 
Beckmann et al. (2006): Vis M (medial visual), Vis L (lateral visual), Aud (auditory), SM (sensorimotor), 






Figure 2. Significant transfer learning accuracy between physiological and pharmacologically-induced 
states of unconsciousness (N3 sleep and LoC), but not between them and pathological states of 
unconsciousness (UWS). (A) Average FC differences for N3 vs. wake (left), LoC vs. wake (center), and 
UWS vs. wake (right), together with anatomical renderings of the top (red) and bottom (blue) 5% 
functional connections associated with the largest difference between states in absolute value. (B) Nodes 
in the diagram represent different brain states (N3, LoC, and UWS) and the arrows between them indicate 
that a machine learning classifier trained to distinguish the source state from W presented significant 
transfer learning accuracy when distinguishing the target state from W (p<0.05, random label shuffling 






Figure 3. Shared patterns of regional FC changes reflect the progression towards unconsciousness during 
sleep and propofol-induced anesthesia, but these similarities do not extend to DoC patients. Each panel 
contains an anatomical rendering of the regions presenting significantly correlated FC changes between 
the states indicated in the insets. Red indicates a significant positive correlation in regional FC changes 






Figure 4. Significant positive correlations between all descriptive distance metrics computed for all pairs 
of states. (A) Matrices containing z-scores of the correlation, classification and model parameter distances 
between all pairs of states of consciousness (B) Graph representation of the matrices in panel A, showing 
only the top 25% matrix elements. (C) Scatterplots establishing the positive and significant correlation 
between all descriptive distance metrics. Each point represents a pair of states, and the shade of purple 
indicates one of the following combinations of states: sleep-sleep, LoC-LoC, DoC-DoC, sleep-LoC, 
sleep-DoC, LoC-DoC. Since variables were converted to ranks prior to the visualization, R and p 






Figure 5. A perturbational metric for the distance between states of consciousness. (A) Matrix 
representation of the the perturbational distance between all pairs of brain states. (B) Directed graph 
representation of the matrix in Panel A, showing the possible externally-induced transitions between pairs 
of states of consciousness (thresholded at ∆𝐺𝑜𝐹 ≤0.3). (C)  Two-dimensional diagram of all states of 
consciousness according to their level of consciousness (i.e. similarity to wakefulness) and their 
instability against external perturbations (sleep states are indicated in blue, S and LoC in purple, and DoC 
in red). (D) Homotopic regions associated with the best ∆𝐺𝑜𝐹 changes in transitions towards states of 
reduced consciousness (blue) and increased consciousness (red). (E) Scatter plots illustrating the non-
significant correlation between perturbational and descriptive distance metrics. Each point represents a 
pair of states, and the shade of purple indicates one of the following combinations of states: sleep-sleep, 
LoC-LoC, DoC-DoC, sleep-LoC, sleep-DoC, LoC-DoC. Since variables were converted to ranks prior to 










Supplementary Information for: “Perturbations in dynamical models of 
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ment Included  
MCS F 34 1 3034 3 3 2 2 0 2 5  yes 
MCS M 62 2 13 0 3 2 1 0 1 6  yes 
MCS F 59 3 21 1 3 2 0 0 2 7  yes 
MCS M 30 1 246 3 2 2 2 0 1 3  yes 
MCS M 83 3 13 3 0 2 1 0 0 5  yes 
MCS M 34 3 1077 3 5 2 0 1 1 4  yes 
MCS M 52 3 20 3 3 2 2 1 2 4  no 
MCS M 47 1 533 3 5 2 1 0 2 13  yes 
MCS M 38 3 1854 1 3 2 2 0 1 4  yes 
MCS M 29 3 64 1 3 2 1 0 2 2  yes 
MCS M 41 2 9900 3 3 2 2 0 2 8  no 
MCS M 23 1 301 1 3 2 1 0 2 6  yes 
MCS M 53 2 1241 0 3 2 2 0 2 5  no 
MCS F 46 3 242 1 3 2 1 0 1 7  yes 
MCS M 60 1 15 3 5 5 3 1 1 1  no 
MCS M 25 1 1157 3 5 5 1 0 2 5  no 
MCS M 61 1 135 3 4 2 1 0 2 7  yes 
MCS M 68 1 360 0 3 2 0 0 2 3  yes 
MCS M 35 1 1331 3 0 2 1 0 2 10  no 
MCS F 48 1 291 2 1 2 2 0 1 8  no 
MCS M 73 3 35 0 2 0 1 0 1 3  yes 
MCS M 23 1 645 3 3 0 1 0 2 8  yes 
MCS M 11 2 1482 3 4 2 2 1 2 9  yes 
MCS F 48 2 215 3 0 5 2 3 0 9  no 
MCS M 66 1 674 3 0 1 2 3 0 5  no 
UWS F 52 3 283 1 0 2 2 0 1 8  yes 
UWS M 36 2 6709 1 0 2 1 0 2 6  yes 
UWS M 30 2 743 1 0 2 1 0 2 7  yes 
UWS M 74 2 92 1 0 1 1 0 1 9  yes 
UWS F 44 2 8 0 0 1 0 0 1 2  yes 
UWS M 67 3 43 1 0 2 1 0 1 5  yes 
UWS M 63 2 30 1 1 2 2 0 2 1  yes 
UWS M 31 1 849 1 1 2 1 0 2 11  yes 
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UWS M 65 2 26 0 0 1 0 0 1 2  yes 
UWS M 87 3 7 0 0 2 1 0 1 1  no 
UWS F 41 2 1572 1 0 1 1 0 2 8  yes 
UWS F 50 2 38 0 0 0 2 0 1 3  yes 
UWS M 44 2 27 1 0 1 0 0 2 1  yes 
UWS F 16 2 27 1 0 1 1 0 1 6  no 
UWS F 49 2 129 1 0 0 1 0 2 5  yes 
UWS M 36 2 2031 1 0 1 2 0 2 6  yes 
UWS M 34 2 7814 1 0 1 1 0 2 5  no 
UWS F 49 2 277 1 0 2 2 0 1 5  yes 
 
Table S1. Patients’ demographic and clinical characteristics. 
Diagnosis: MCS: minimally conscious state, UWS: vegetative state/ unresponsive wakefulness 
syndrome. Etiology: 1: traumatic brain injury, 2: anoxia, 3: other 
Coma Recovery Scale-Revised subscales:Auditory function 4: Consistent Movement to Command, 3: 
Reproducible Movement to Command, 2: Localization to Sound, 1: Auditory 
Startle, 0: None. Visual function 5: Object Recognition, 4: Object Localization: Reaching, 3: Visual 
Pursuit, 2: Fixation, 1: Visual Startle, 0: None. Motor function 6: Functional Object Use, 5: Automatic 
Motor Response, 4: Object Manipulation, 3: Localization to Noxious 
Stimulation, 2: Flexion Withdrawal, 1: Abnormal Posturing, 0: None/Flaccid. Oromotor/Verbal 
function 3: Intelligible Verbalization, 2: Vocalization/Oral Movement, 1: Oral Reflexive Movement, 0: 
None. Communication scale 2: Functional: Accurate, 1: Non-Functional: Intentional, 0: None. Arousal 
scale 3: Attention, 2: Eye Opening without stimulation, 1: Eye Opening with stimulation 0: Unarousable. 
Inclusion field stands for the subject that were included in the full analysis after fMRI pre-processing. 
 
